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Abstract 
Against the background of the ongoing debate around European democracy promotion, we 
investigate the impact of European citizens’ socio-economic backgrounds, political 
orientations and countries of origin on their support for democracy promotion in general 
and on democracy promotion via military means. Analysing survey data from 11 
European Union (EU) member countries, we show that citizens with more extreme 
political orientations are less likely to support general democracy promotion. In contrast, 
particularly those citizens with extreme rightist orientations are more likely to support 
democracy promotion via military means. Regarding the impact of socio-economic 
background variables, higher education and working skills are positively associated with 
democracy promotion in general but make citizens less likely to support democracy 
promotion via military means. Finally, even if the majority of Europeans do not support 
democracy promotion via military means, the heterogeneity of country effects suggests 
that the assumption of a common European identity regarding democracy promotion needs 
to be refined. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, Western democracies increasingly have engaged in promoting 
the emergence and consolidation of democratic structures abroad.1 In several cases, they 
also have used military means to remove authoritarian regimes from power and to back 
subsequent efforts in democratic state-building. Whether and when these efforts of 
democracy promotion have been successful is nevertheless a disputed issue among social 
scientists, even more in cases where there were military interventions. In the context of 
these debates, European actors are often said to have a more civilian or peaceful approach 
to democracy promotion than the United States (e.g. Manners 2002; Youngs 2004; 
Boerzel / Risse 2009). Yet, in principle, the EU also considers military interventions to be 
part of its foreign-policy portfolio, and European countries have participated in military 
interventions aimed at removing highly repressive regimes. Still, the legitimacy of military 
interventions such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya has been the source of 
permanent quarrels among European decision-makers, casting some doubts about whether 
there is a common European identity core value regarding the use of force as a legitimate 
means for democratic state-building. 
In this article, we tackle the issue of democracy promotion from the perspective of the 
European citizenry. At least to our knowledge, the literature on democracy promotion has 
been impressively silent regarding the analysis of public support for this dimension of 
foreign policy. Little is known about the citizen characteristics that determine support for 
democracy promotion. This is in contrast to the substantial research on the relation 
between public opinion and the making of foreign policy as well as on the varying support 
for military intervention and its impact on the making of foreign policy (e.g. Aldrich et al. 
2006; Eichenberg 2007; Gelpi et al. 2009; Knack / Paxton 2012). Existing polls on 
democracy promotion have only been interpreted in a descriptive manner, and there is 
little knowledge about the variance in citizens’ support for building and shielding 
democracy elsewhere. 
This paper is a first step towards filling the identified research gap. We provide evidence 
as to why some European citizens favour democracy promotion and others do not. 
Moreover, we differentiate between diffuse support for democracy promotion in general 
and specific support for military interventions as a means to remove authoritarian regimes 
and establish democracy elsewhere. We base our findings on the analysis of pooled survey 
data from the Transatlantic Trends surveys conducted between 2005 and 2008. By using 
the available survey information on socio-economic backgrounds, political orientations as 
well as cross-country data from military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, we identify 
factors that determine whether a citizen supports democracy promotion in general and 
whether she considers military intervention to be an appropriate tool for this purpose. Our 
empirical findings can be summarised as follows:  
Firstly, there is a highly significant and curvilinear relation between citizens’ overall 
political orientations on a left-to-right scale and their preferences for democracy 
promotion in general. Neither citizens who consider themselves to be on the extreme left 
                                                 
1  Research on European democracy promotion has increased steadily, especially regarding its 
neighbourhood policies (e.g. Youngs 2001; Pridham 2005; Kelley 2006; Magen et al. 2009; 
Schimmelfennig / Scholz 2008). 
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nor those on the extreme right are likely to support democracy promotion. In contrast, this 
curvilinear relation changes when citizens are asked about their preferences regarding 
military interventions as a means of promoting democracy. Then the relation becomes J-
shaped, with citizens on the extreme right being more likely to support such an 
interventionist foreign-policy strategy. 
Secondly, the impact of socio-economic background variables also reveals differences 
regarding the support of general democracy promotion and democracy promotion via 
military means. Although the age of the respondents is positively related to general 
democracy promotion, younger citizens are more likely to prefer democracy promotion via 
military means. Moreover, citizens with higher education levels and better working skills 
are more likely to object to democracy promotion via military means, while at the same 
time those citizens with better working skills are more inclined towards general 
democracy promotion. 
Thirdly, there is an impact of casualties from the military interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq on citizens’ support for democracy promotion, which is consistent with research on 
US military interventions (e.g. Mueller 1973; Gelpi et al. 2006). As expected, the death 
tolls of soldiers from the intervening country negatively affect the support for democracy 
promotion by citizens in that country in general over the full four-year period studied. 
However, this effect disappears for the two-year period for which we have data on 
citizens’ support for democracy promotion via military intervention.  
Overall, our results show that it makes a large difference whether people are asked about 
their diffuse and general support for democracy promotion or their particular support for 
democracy promotion via military intervention. Citizens’ attitudes towards democracy 
promotion via military intervention are not only related to respondents’ affinities for 
democratic governance but also to their attitudes towards armed conflict. Thus, when 
asked about their support for democracy promotion via military means, respondents might 
face a quandary in reconciling the objective of democracy promotion with the means of 
military intervention. Comparing the responses to the two different questions provides 
insights into citizens’ (implicit) hierarchy of preferences. Here, our results suggest that the 
armed-conflict component of the question outweighs the democracy-promotion 
component.  
Finally, we find strong country effects. On the one hand, a large majority of European 
citizens support democracy promotion in general but a similarly large majority reject 
military intervention as a means for this purpose. This provides some support for those 
who argue that there is a civilian norm endogenous to European democracy promotion. 
However, our analysis also clearly reveals that this overall pattern is not spread uniformly 
across Europe. Instead, a citizen’s country of origin often influences her likelihood of 
supporting democracy promotion – a finding that highlights the importance of particular 
historic and political country settings. 
In the next section, we review the relevant literature and identify the research gap before 
deducing a set of hypotheses regarding the support of democracy promotion in general and 
democracy promotion via military intervention (Section 2). Thereafter, we present our 
data and the findings from our econometric survey analysis (Section 3). In the last section 
(Section 4), we sum up our major findings and offer an outlook for further research. 
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2 Research gap and hypotheses  
Western democracies increasingly have been engaged in external democracy promotion – 
a trend accompanied by a rising level of attention paid by academia to the issue. Different 
actors, strategies and instruments of democracy promotion have been studied by scholars 
of the social sciences. Goal conflicts between democracy promotion and other foreign-
policy objectives have been a focus of research (e.g. Grimm / Leininger 2012) and 
scholars have begun to investigate whether autocracies also invest in promoting autocracy 
elsewhere (Bader et al. 2010). Moreover, the effectiveness of democracy promotion has 
been explored by ever more sophisticated methods: either at the aggregate level through 
econometric cross-country analysis or at the project level through experimental and quasi-
experimental research designs.2 
Most attempts to support democracy have been characterised by civilian means. Still, 
Western democracies have not limited their efforts to peaceful strategies of democracy 
support. In several cases they utilised military means, even if the effectiveness of such 
extreme measures continues to be highly controversial (e.g. Meernik 1996; Gleditsch et al. 
2004; Bueno de Mesquita / Downs 2006; Grimm / Merkel 2008). Although many of the 
most prominent military interventions such as those in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq were 
responses to severe human rights violations or (perceived) terrorist threats, long-term 
military engagements in those countries were nevertheless legitimised by referring to the 
objective of democratic state-building. Particularly against the background of the 
democratic peace theorem and reinforced by an emerging norm for humanitarian 
intervention, military interventions in highly repressive regimes have therefore 
increasingly been connected to the cause of democracy promotion (Gleditsch et al. 2004).  
Legitimising military interventions by referring to the objective of democracy promotion 
has been traditionally more pronounced in US foreign policy (Meernik 1996). Since the 
1990s, however, it has also become a prominent line of argument among European 
governments, which increasingly have legitimised such engagements by referring to the 
objective of democratic state-building.3 Yet, European governments have been far from 
uniformly endorsing military intervention as a means for democracy promotion. Instead, 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of a military intervention for democracy promotion has 
remained a highly controversial issue within and across European countries. This 
heterogeneity was prominently illustrated by the divided position of European 
governments over the military intervention in Iraq. In fact, the European division over the 
military intervention in Iraq and the subsequent intellectual debates (e.g. Habermas / 
Derrida 2003; Schuster / Maier 2006; Börzel / Risse 2009) have shed serious doubts about 
whether Europe can be considered a “normative power” (Manners 2002; 2006) with a 
civilian identity regarding democracy promotion. 
                                                 
2  For instance, cross-country statistical analyses have looked at the effect of democracy aid (e.g. Finkel et 
al. 2007; Kalyvitis / Vlachaki 2010; or Dietrich / Wright 2012). Other scholars have analysed the effect 
of political conditionality (e.g. Schimmelfennig / Scholz 2008). Alternatively, experimental and quasi-
experimental research designs are increasingly used to identify the impacts of concrete projects aimed 
at fostering democratic participation and accountability (e.g. Garcia 2013). 
3  Experimental studies show that military intervention is perceived as less illegitimate by the intervening 
country if the intervention is against a non-democratic country (Falomir-Pichastor et al. 2012). 
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Despite these vivid debates about a common European identity as well as mounting 
research on democracy promotion, little is known about the political attitudes of citizens 
towards this dimension of foreign policy. This research gap is also surprising because of a 
well-established literature relating to public opinion on foreign policy.4 It is widely 
recognised that public opinion can have an impact on foreign-policy decisions of policy-
makers. Yet, so far it has not been studied which social or political factors determine 
citizens’ general support for democracy promotion.5 Instead, the few polls asking for the 
attitudes of the broader public regarding democracy promotion have only been analysed 
with descriptive statistics (e.g. DeBartolo 2008). In a similar vein, some effort has been 
undertaken to identify what potential factors drive – particularly in the United States – 
public support for military intervention in general (Eichenberg 2005; Boettcher / Cobb 
2006; Gelpi et al. 2009). Again, however, the literature has remained silent about 
individual determinants affecting Europeans’ preferences for democracy promotion via 
military interventions and the extent to which these are different from those that drive a 
more general and diffuse support for democracy promotion. This is regrettable because – 
as in the case of foreign aid (Knack / Paxton 2012: 172) – insights about individual and 
contextual factors influencing the support of democracy promotion also can help to 
explain the varying efforts and strategies that governments employ.6 
Against this background, we develop a set of hypotheses assuming that the variance in 
support from Europeans towards democracy promotion is caused by several socio-
economic variables, political orientations and national-background variables. 
Socio-economic background: Our first perspective on tackling the question why some 
citizens support democracy promotion while others do not is through the lens of 
modernisation theory. Our basic assumption is that those citizens who are inclined towards 
democratic values will also be more likely to support external democracy promotion. 
Therefore, based on modernisation theory and research on political culture (Lipset 1959; 
Almond / Verba 1963), one could argue that citizens with higher education levels and 
those living in urban or metropolitan areas should have a preference for democracy 
promotion because they are the ones who are also more likely to endorse democratic 
values. Urbanisation, higher education levels and higher levels of professional skills are 
associated with occupations that require more independent thinking and behaviour. These 
things better equip people to follow complex political processes, thus provoking political 
attitudes more inclined towards democratic values (e.g. Inglehart / Welzel 2009). Such 
democratic values could then translate into general and diffuse support for democracy 
promotion as a foreign-policy objective. At the same time, this socio-economic 
background does not necessarily imply a positive disposition towards utilising military 
means as the most interventionist form of democracy promotion. On the contrary: it is 
                                                 
4  Traditionally, most public opinion analysis on foreign policy has been focussed on the United States. 
However, research on Europeans’ attitudes towards foreign policy issues has been increasing steadily in 
the last decades (e.g. Eichenberg 1989; Eichenberg 2007; Risse-Kappen 1991; Schön 2007). 
5  For an overview on the responsiveness of Western democracies to public opinion regarding foreign 
policy issues, see Thiem (2013). 
6  For instance, the allocation of foreign aid is said to be influenced not only by recipient countries’ needs 
and merits but also by public opinion (Van Belle / Hook 2000; Rioux / Van Belle 2005). Similarly, the 
decision to spend aid bi- or multilaterally has also been influenced by perceptions of the citizenry 
(Milner 2006). 
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especially lower levels of education that are often said to lead to the likelihood of 
supporting armed conflict (e.g. Østby / Urdal 2010) or the likelihood of having militaristic 
attitudes (Shayo 2007). Arguments in support of education for generating tolerance and 
pluralist values draw on Aristotle, who stated that education produces a culture of peace 
(Lipset 1959, 79). An economic perspective (e.g. Collier / Hoeffler 2004) reaches a similar 
conclusion, as higher levels of education are said to increase the opportunity costs of 
violent conflict. Given these considerations, we formulate two hypotheses: 
H1: Citizens with higher education levels and working skills are more likely to 
support democracy promotion in general. 
H2: Citizens with higher education levels and working skills are less likely to 
support democracy promotion via military intervention. 
Thus, the same socio-economic background that is supposed to lead towards support for 
democracy promotion in general is expected to be negatively associated with the use of 
force and military intervention. Empirical support for H2 would imply that the component 
of military intervention included in the question outweighs the component of democracy 
promotion. 
Political orientations: Our second approach to our question relates to citizens’ political 
orientations. We expect that citizens’ positions on a political left-right scale affect their 
dispositions towards democracy promotion. Extremist political attitudes are said to be less 
compatible with democratic values. This holds for right-wing extremism (e.g. Lubbers et 
al. 2002, 365) and – even to a smaller extent – for the far-left on the political spectrum 
(e.g. McClosky / Chong 1985; Regta et al. 2011). Accordingly, we expect neither citizens 
on the extreme right nor those on the extreme left to support general democracy 
promotion, simply because they are less likely to be supportive of democracy in general. 
However, when we ask about support for democracy promotion via military means, we 
expect to find different impacts, depending on the citizens’ political orientations. We have 
hypothesised that citizens with less extreme political orientations will be more likely to 
support democracy promotion in general. At the same time, citizens with modest political 
orientations should be less likely to support military intervention as a means for achieving 
this goal. In general, citizens with extreme ideological positions are said to be more likely 
to accept the use of force as a means for achieving their political goals. For instance, right-
wing extremism in Europe has often been associated with political violence (e.g. Hagtvet 
1994; Sprinzaka 1995) and citizens at the right of the political spectrum are associated 
with being more supportive of military interventions.7 Similarly, citizens who support 
revolutionary ideologies from the far left are also considered to be more likely to accept 
political violence as a means for accomplishing their political objectives. Prominent 
illustrations for the latter include terrorist and guerrilla movements such as Germany’s 
Red Army Faction, the Shining Path in Peru and Naxalite rebels in India. Followers of 
extreme leftist ideologies also tend to legitimise military intervention, even if modest 
leftist internationalism is associated with non-interventionist positions and international 
solidarity movements. 
                                                 
7  For instance, in the US Republicans are more supportive of military interventions than Democrats 
(Gelpi et al. 2009, 85). 
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Accordingly, our third and fourth hypotheses predict a different curvilinear relationship 
between political orientations on a left-right scale and the support for general democracy 
promotion and democracy promotion via military means, respectively: 
H3: Citizens with more extreme political attitudes on a left-right scale are less likely 
to support democracy promotion in general. 
H4: Citizens with less extreme political attitudes on a left-right scale are less likely 
to support democracy promotion via military interventions. 
Casualties: A third approach towards our research question relates to the casualties of 
military intervention (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2006; Koch 2011). The most prominent attempts of 
democracy promotion in recent years have been related to military interventions such as in 
the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. As research on US military interventions has shown 
since the Vietnam War, the number of US casualties had a negative impact on public 
support for those interventions (Mueller 1973; Gelpi et al. 2006). Particularly for the 
period under investigation, it is therefore plausible that the number of casualties of a given 
European country in the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq is negatively associated with 
citizens’ support for democracy promotion in general and with democracy promotion via 
military means. 
H5: Citizens’ support for democracy promotion and for democracy promotion via 
military means is negatively affected by military casualties suffered during 
interventions to remove authoritarian regimes. 
Finally, we do not expect that European citizens’ attitudes towards democracy promotion 
are similar in different countries, particularly when it comes to military intervention. On 
the one hand, Europe is often said to have a civil identity in favour of peaceful democracy 
support, even if European governments try to embed several of their military interventions 
within a context of democratic state-building. On the other hand, there are several reasons 
to expect significant variance among citizens in different European countries that cannot 
be explained by the discussed socio-economic or political variables, but rather by 
particular country contexts. For instance, among major European powers, France and the 
United Kingdom have utilised the military to intervene on a regular basis, whereas 
Germany has remained a much more cautious actor when it comes to the deployment of 
military force (Miskimmon 2009). Emerging democracies in Eastern Europe have also 
been identified as engaging in democracy promotion, but at the same time tend to be more 
reluctant to participate in military interventions (Jonavicius 2008). Finally, the military 
intervention in Iraq and subsequent civil-military engagement for democratic state-
building has remained a highly controversial issue among European governments and has 
produced a “rift” in European foreign policy (e.g. Schuster / Maier 2006). Overall, we 
therefore expect that even in Europe the concrete country context of respondents still 
exerts a significant impact on individuals regarding their attitudes towards democracy 
promotion.   
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3 Empirical evidence 
3.1 Data set and variables 
The data used in the following analysis are culled from four series of Transatlantic Trends 
annual surveys, which are conducted to gauge general attitudes on foreign policies in 
Europe and the United States. The sample consists of 42,173 respondents from 11 
European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, United Kingdom. Approximately 1,000 respondents of at least 
18 years of age were randomly selected and interviewed in each of the 11 countries.8 
In contrast to other surveys on foreign policy, the Transatlantic Trends surveys conducted 
in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 contained questions concerning respondents’ attitudes 
towards democracy promotion in other countries. The responses are used as dependent 
variables in this study.9 Between 2005 and 2008, respondents were asked about their 
general attitude regarding democracy promotion of the EU. More concretely, they were 
asked whether it should be “the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in 
other countries”. Moreover, in 2005 and 2006, the survey also contained a question 
regarding the opinions of respondents on potential EU military interventions to remove 
authoritarian regimes. Among the several alternative means for democracy promotion, 
citizens were asked concretely about whether they would support the EU in helping to 
build democracy in an authoritarian regime through “sending military forces to remove 
authoritarian regimes”. 
Unfortunately, those two questions did not ask respondents about their preferences for 
democracy promotion as a topic as such; instead both questions were linked to the 
particular role of the European Union. Thus, the responses could also be a reflection of 
citizens’ attitudes towards the EU in general or towards the role of the EU in the 
international system. Fortunately, however, the survey also contained particular questions 
about citizens’ sympathies towards the EU in general and about their attitudes towards the 
international role of the EU in world affairs. Concretely, respondents were asked the 
following two questions: 
1)  “How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?” 
2)  “I’d like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people [in 
this case, the European Union], with 100 meaning very warm, favorable feeling and 0 
meaning a very cold unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly cold or 
warm.” 
                                                 
8  In 2005, Romania and Bulgaria were not included in the survey. In total there are 29,970 valid 
observations. The reduced number of observations is because of the following: (i) respondents refused 
to answer; (ii) respondents did not know the answer; and (iii) the question was not applicable. The 
survey was conducted using either Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews or conducted face-to-face 
in countries where response rates using telephones tend to be low. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Turkey in 2008 and 2006; Poland and Slovakia 
in 2005.  
9  For instance surveys such as the European Values Study, the Eurobarometer and the New Europe 
Barometer do not ask questions pertaining to democracy promotion in particular but rather about 
respondents’ general perceptions of democracy within their respective countries. 
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The information from those two questions allows for coping with the abovementioned 
problem. Using the responses regarding the two questions on attitudes towards the EU as 
independent variables, we are confident to absorb the proportion of variance in our 
dependent variable that is generated by citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. Moreover, 
during the whole survey period, citizens were also asked about their feelings towards Iran 
– one of the most prominent Islamist autocracies. We include this information as an 
independent variable because citizens with lower levels of sympathy for the Iranian 
regime might associate democracy promotion as a means to counter Islamist influence in 
the Middle East.10 
To investigate the impact of socio-economic background variables on citizens’ support for 
democracy promotion, we differentiate between gender, age, household size, education 
level, rural respectively urban origins and highly skilled vs. other types of workers. In 
order to capture the impact of political attitudes on citizens’ support for democracy 
promotion, we include a question in which citizens were asked about their political 
orientations on a left-right scale. 
“In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a 
scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means the extreme left and 7 means the extreme right?” 
Finally, we analyse whether the amount of casualties suffered by military forces of 
Western allies fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have had an impact on respondents’ 
preferences for democracy promotion. We obtained these data from Casualties.org 
(downloaded April 13, 2011), which provided detailed information such as the soldier’s 
name, date of death, nationality, age, rank, cause of death and place of death. For this 
analysis, we consider all types of troop casualties – from hostiles and friendly fire to 
accidents. We count the number of deaths six months before (short-term) and one year 
before (long term) the respective surveys of Transatlantic Trends were conducted.11 
Differentiating between short- and long-term horizons allows for analysing whether 
perceptions towards democracy promotion and troop casualties tend to change over time. 
3.2 Descriptive findings and estimation strategy 
According to a descriptive analysis of the data (see Appendix), out of 29,970 valid 
observations, about 76 per cent of the respondents thought that it should be the role of the 
EU to establish democracy in other countries. In contrast, only 29 per cent of the 
population thought that it should be the role of the European Union to use military means 
for democracy promotion. From a country perspective, again, most respondents are geared 
towards democracy promotion (ranging from 59 per cent to 90 per cent). In terms of 
sending military forces to promote democracy elsewhere, only 16 to 37 per cent of the 
                                                 
10  Concretely, citizens were asked to respond to the following question: “I’d like you to rate your feelings 
toward some countries, institutions and people [in this case, Iran], with 100 meaning very warm, 
favorable feeling and 0 meaning a very cold unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly cold 
or warm.” 
11  Given the fact that the surveys took place approximately between June 1 and June 30, we counted 
casualties for each country between January 1 and May 30 of the same year. For the long-term horizon, 
we counted casualties between June 1 of the previous year and May 30 of the current year. 
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respondents were in favour of such interventions, notably with the United Kingdom 
having the highest number of respondents being in favour and Bulgaria having the lowest. 
At first glance, this descriptive snapshot supports the claim that Europeans – on average – 
are very much in favour of democracy promotion but not through military means. 
However, this information should be taken cautiously because descriptive statistics cannot 
account for the potential EU bias of the information presented above. To better assess the 
effects of socio-economic background variables, political orientations and casualties on 
public support for democracy promotion, we therefore adopt the following specifications: 
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The dependent variable is either a citizen’s general attitude towards democracy promotion 
or her attitude towards democracy promotion via military means. In both cases, the 
variable is a (0/1) dummy reflecting the citizens’ responses. The estimation for democracy 
promotion in general was conducted for the complete sample period between 2005 and 
2008. A separate estimation was conducted for the period between 2005 and 2006, 
allowing us to compare the results between general democracy promotion and democracy 
promotion via military means during the same period. 
The matrix of regressors includes political orientation and its squared term, troop deaths in 
either six-month or one-year periods, the individual’s socio-economic background, the 
respondent’s view about the EU’s role in world affairs as well as their feelings towards the 
EU and Iran. Additionally, the vector of controls includes country and year dummies to 
account for country and time effects. All regression estimates are weighted according to 
the size of the population. Due to the non-panel nature of the data, the determinants of 
democracy promotion were estimated using pooled annual samples (2005–2008) of 11 
European countries. 
3.3 Results 
Table 1 presents the marginal effects of our estimations for the full model regarding the 
support for democracy promotion in general.12 The first two rows of Table 1 present the 
results for the whole four-year period. The last two rows only take into account the 2005–
2006 period, which allows for a direct comparison with the results of citizens’ attitudes 
regarding democracy promotion via military intervention.  
The impact of the socio-economic variables offers some support for our first hypothesis 
(H1) but not without ambiguities. Age and professional skills are statistically significant 
                                                 
12  To check the consistency of the estimates, the Appendix provides the results, when the variables are 
introduced gradually. Here, one model consists only of socio-economic characteristics. Hereafter, 
variables on international orientation are introduced, whereas a third model contains the full model, 
including variables on political orientations and troop deaths. Marginal effects were calculated only for 
the full models presented in the main text. 
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Table 1: Preferences for general democracy promotion 2005–2008 and 2005–2006 
Democracy Promotion 2005–2008 2005–2006 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 Coeff.  St. 
Error 
Coeff.  St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Male  0.005 (0.006)  0.005 (0.006)  0.024a (0.008)  0.024a (0.008) 
Age  0.001a (0.000)  0.001a (0.000)  0.001a (0.000)  0.001a (0.000) 
Household size -0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) -0.006 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) 
Elementary school or less -0.008 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008) -0.024b (0.011) -0.025b (0.011) 
Metropolitan -0.005 (0.007) -0.006 (0.007) -0.016c (0.010) -0.016 (0.010) 
Highly skilled workers  0.013b (0.006)  0.013b (0.006)  0.018b (0.009)  0.018b (0.009) 
EU leadership  0.083a (0.007)  0.083a (0.007)  0.070a (0.010)  0.069a (0.010) 
EU feeling  0.002a (0.000)  0.002a (0.000)  0.002a (0.000)  0.002a (0.000) 
Iran feeling -0.001a (0.000) -0.001a (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Political orientation  0.034a (0.009)  0.034a (0.009)  0.031b (0.013)  0.031b (0.013) 
Political orientation sq. -0.004a (0.001) -0.004a (0.001) -0.003c (0.002) -0.003b (0.002) 
Deaths half year -0.01b (0.005)    0.023 (0.019)   
Deaths one year   -0.007 (0.005)    0.005 (0.007) 
Year 2006 -0.032a (0.008) -0.033a (0.008) -0.038a (0.009) -0.034a (0.008) 
Year 2007 -0.024a (0.008) -0.024a (0.008)     
Year 2008 -0.043a (0.008) -0.039a (0.008)     
Germany  0.081a (0.013)  0.085a (0.013)  0.155a (0.028)  0.133a (0.022) 
France  0.069a (0.013)  0.072a (0.013)  0.096a (0.022)  0.098a (0.022) 
Spain  0.232a (0.015)  0.231a (0.015)  0.322a (0.030)  0.304a (0.025) 
Italy  0.062a (0.014)  0.063a (0.014)  0.053b (0.026)  0.066a (0.023) 
United Kingdom -0.022 (0.018) -0.028 (0.019) -0.055 (0.039) -0.027 (0.027) 
Netherlands  0.053a (0.013)  0.053a (0.013)  0.121a (0.029)  0.102a (0.022) 
Portugal  0.174a (0.015)  0.175a (0.015)  0.264a (0.031)  0.244a (0.025) 
Poland  0.061a (0.014)  0.062a (0.014)  0.132a (0.026)  0.115a (0.022) 
Slovakia  0.005 (0.014)  0.008 (0.014)  0.065b (0.029)  0.045b (0.022) 
Bulgaria -0.018 (0.015) -0.016 (0.015)  0.023 (0.032) -0.003 (0.024) 
Observations 29970 29970 14624 14624 
Notes:  Marginal effects of full model, 2005–2008. Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
a significant at the 1 per cent level; b significant at the 5 per cent level; c significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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polaxism
1 7
.227015
.506714
polaxis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
.705755
.813212
 
throughout all models: older citizens and highly skilled ones are more likely to support 
democracy promotion. As expected, a low level of education (elementary schooling or 
less) impacts negatively and is statistically significant, yet only in the two-year period 
from 2005 to 2006. Hence, higher education levels and working skills – classical variables 
from modernisation theory – impact positively on attitudes towards democracy promotion. 
Table 1 also strongly supports hypothesis 3 (H3). There is a highly significant curvilinear 
relation between citizens’ political orientations and support for democracy promotion. 
Both the original variable on political orientations and its squared term are highly 
significant – the first having a positive sign and the latter a negative sign. Figure 1 depicts 
that citizens who have more extreme political orientations are less likely to support 
democracy promotion, whereas those with moderate orientations are more likely to do so; 
the peak of the inverted u-curve is slightly to the right of the centre.  
Finally, our test for the impact of casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq over the full four-year 
period shows that the variable on the number of casualties (log) six months prior to the 
respective survey is negative and highly significant. As we expected (H5), citizens are 
sensitive to the most serious costs of democracy promotion. However, when a longer time 
period (one year) is taken into account, the variable on casualties loses its statistical 
significance. These results suggest that the impact of the number of casualties in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have an impact on Europeans’ support for democracy promotion, but 
only regarding short-term information. When only considering the 2005–2006 period in 
Table 1, both variables – while still having the same direction – are not statistically 
significant anymore, which might be due to the reduced time span. 
Do these results on general democracy promotion hold when it comes to supporting the 
most interventionist means of democracy promotion, namely removing authoritarian 
regimes via military means? The results in Table 2 clearly depict that this is not the case. 
In Models 1 and 2, whereas the variables on international orientations have a similar impact   
Figures 1 and 2: Political orientation and democracy promotion (2005–2006) 
Political orientation and the probability of suppor-
ting democracy promotion in general  
Political orientation and the probability of suppor-
ting democracy promotion via military means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vertical bars indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals. Political orientation (polaxis and polaxism) 
defined as: 1=Extreme Left, 2=Left, 3=Centre Left, 4=Centre 5=Centre Right 6=Right 7=Extreme Right. 
The graphs are based on Monte Carlo simulations of full model without weights using the STATA 
program CLARIFY. Refer to King et al. (2000) for detailed description.  
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Table 2: Preferences for democracy promotion via military intervention 2005–2006 
Send military  
force 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff St. Error Coeff. St. Error 
Male  0.015c (0.009)  0.015c (0.009)  0.009 (0.009)  0.010 (0.009) 
Age -0.004a (0.000) -0.004a (0.000) -0.004a (0.000) -0.004a (0.000) 
Household size -0.001 (0.005) -0.000 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) 
Elementary  
school or less 
 0.076a (0.012)  0.076a (0.012)  0.077a (0.012)  0.078a (0.012) 
Metropolitan -0.032a (0.010) -0.033a (0.010) -0.031a (0.011) -0.031a (0.010) 
Highly skilled  
workers 
-0.038a (0.009) -0.038a (0.009) -0.040a (0.009) -0.040a (0.009) 
EU leadership  0.019c (0.012)  0.020c (0.012)  0.013 (0.012)  0.013 (0.012) 
EU feeling  0.001b (0.000)  0.001b (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Iran feeling -0.002a (0.000) -0.002a (0.000) -0.001a (0.000) -0.002a (0.000) 
Political 
orientation 
-0.045a (0.016) -0.046a (0.016) -0.048a (0.016) -0.048a (0.016) 
Political 
orientation  
squared 
 0.010a (0.002)  0.010a (0.002)  0.010a (0.002)  0.010a (0.002) 
Democracy 
promotion 
     0.149a (0.012)  0.149a (0.012) 
Deaths half 
year 
-0.017 (0.020)   -0.018 (0.020)   
Deaths one 
year 
Year 2006 
 
-0.080a 
 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
-0.083a 
(0.008) 
(0.008) 
 
-0.090a 
 
(0.009) 
-0.005 (0.008) 
Germany -0.084b (0.035) -0.068b (0.029) -0.116a (0.035) -0.080a (0.008) 
France  0.039 (0.029)  0.039 (0.029)  0.012 (0.029) -0.099a (0.030) 
Spain -0.042 (0.035) -0.029 (0.030) -0.086b (0.035)  0.013 (0.029) 
Italy -0.124a (0.033) -0.132a (0.031) -0.141a (0.034) -0.073b (0.031) 
United 
Kingdom 
 0.118a (0.045)  0.099a (0.034)  0.115b (0.046) -0.150a (0.031) 
Netherlands  0.042 (0.035)  0.056c (0.029) 0.014 (0.035)  0.097a (0.035) 
Portugal -0.009 (0.035)  0.005 (0.030) -0.045 (0.036)  0.029 (0.030) 
Poland -0.055c (0.032) -0.043 (0.030) -0.081b (0.033) -0.031 (0.030) 
Slovakia -0.191a (0.037) -0.176a (0.031) -0.205a (0.038) -0.068b (0.030) 
Bulgaria -0.163a (0.043) -0.142a (0.037) -0.170a (0.044) -0.189a (0.032) 
Observations 14089 14089 13658 13658 
Notes:  Marginal effects of full model, 2005–2006. Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
a significant at the 1 per cent level; b significant at the 5 per cent level; c significant at the 10 per cent 
level. 
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as in the case of general democracy promotion, the results exhibit highly relevant 
differences with regard to socio-economic backgrounds and political orientations. These 
differences remain, even if controlling for support for general democracy promotion, as is 
depicted in Models 3 and 4.  
First of all, citizens’ socio-economic backgrounds are again an important factor in 
explaining support for democracy promotion via military means, but citizens with higher 
education levels and working skills are less likely to support such interventionist policies 
of the EU. This support for H2 suggests that citizens – when asked about their attitudes 
towards democracy via military intervention – consider the military component of the 
question to be more important than the democracy-promotion component. 
Similarly, political orientations also matter, but now the original curvilinear relation turns 
upside down. The upward-sloping convex curve (J-shaped) confirms hypothesis 4. In 
other words, people with more extreme political orientations are more likely to support 
democracy promotion via military means because such political orientations make it 
more probable that those people will support violent means to achieve a political goal. 
However, as depicted in Figure 2, the angular point of this non-linear relation is located 
left of centre; those orientated more to the left are more likely to oppose military 
intervention compared to those more on the right – with the exception of relatively 
extreme positions on the left. Again, this finding suggests that Europeans consider the 
military component of the question to be more important than the democracy-promotion 
component. 
Both short-term and long-term variables on casualties – while still being negative – are not 
statistically significant anymore. An interpretation for this phenomenon could be that 
those who consciously express their support or opposition for military interventions to 
promote democracy are maintaining their position, irrespective of the number of casualties 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Citizens have firmer preferences when asked about the most 
extreme form of democracy promotion, wherein the level of casualties does not reach an 
upper (for supporters) or lower (for opponents) threshold to change their respective 
positions. However, due to the short time span of two years, this interpretation should be 
taken with caution. As has been demonstrated in Table 1 with regard to support for general 
democracy promotion, the statistical significance of the variable vanishes when using the 
shorter two-year period. 
Finally, Tables 1 and 2 reveal strong country effects. Thus, despite the relevance of socio-
economic variables or political orientations across European countries, country-specific 
factors also shape Europeans’ attitudes towards democracy promotion. When compared 
against a reference country (Romania), many country coefficients are statistically 
significant – a result that holds if the reference country is changed. This finding is of 
particular relevance in the case of democracy promotion via military means. Here, only 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France display positive coefficients, with the 
UK coefficient being statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficients of Bulgaria, 
Germany, Italy and Slovakia are negative and statistically significant. 
Taking the example of two major European players in democracy promotion – the United 
Kingdom and Germany – shows the relevance of these differences. As Table 2 reveals, 
compared to Romania, the probability that a comparable UK respondent has a positive 
attitude towards democracy promotion via military means increases by 11.8 per cent, 
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whereas it decreases by 8.4 per cent if the respondent is from Germany. This example 
illustrates that there is still much variance among citizens from different European 
countries when it comes to their preferences for democracy promotion and its most 
interventionist form. Still, it could be argued that those differences were the results of 
respondents’ attitudes of loyalty towards their respective government’s foreign policies, 
which were markedly different during the intervention in Iraq. However, such an 
interpretation seems to be misleading if one considers the country effects of Italy,  
France, Poland or Spain, where citizens’ attitudes did not correspond to the positions of 
their governments towards Iraq. Apparently, ongoing quarrels among European gov-
ernments about when and how to intervene to remove highly repressive regimes are at 
least partly rooted in particular country contexts. Against this background, assumptions 
about Europe’s common civilian identity for peaceful democracy promotion should be 
approached with some caution. 
4 Conclusions 
The instruments, strategies and effectiveness of European democracy promotion have 
gained increasing amounts of attention from scholars in the social sciences. However, 
research has put little attention on European citizens’ preferences for democracy 
promotion. This lack of knowledge regarding European citizens’ varying levels of support 
for democracy promotion in general and for democracy promotion via military means 
stands in stark contrast to the increasing interest in European democracy support and its 
underlying normative dimensions. 
Against this background, our empirical analysis has carved out several factors at the 
individual level that have significantly influenced Europeans’ support for democracy 
promotion in general and democracy promotion by military intervention. Our results show 
the systematic effects of socio-economic background variables and political orientations 
on the likelihood that citizens will support democracy promotion. Interestingly, these 
variables impacted differently on attitudes regarding democracy promotion via military 
means. Whereas socio-economic background variables such as higher professional skills 
and education levels showed a positive impact on Europeans’ support for democracy 
promotion in general, those factors were negatively related to democracy promotion via 
military force. Regarding citizens’ political orientations, neither citizens on the extreme 
left nor those on the extreme right were likely to support democracy promotion. Yet, when 
asked about the support of democracy promotion via military means, the relation became 
J-shaped, with citizens on the extreme right being most likely to support such measures. 
Overall, it made a large difference whether Europeans were asked about their support for 
democracy promotion in general or democracy promotion via military intervention. Facing 
a potential goal conflict between the objective of democracy promotion and the means of 
military intervention, our results suggest that the issue of military intervention has tended 
to be of superior importance. 
While these individual-level effects are far from negligible in size, our analysis also 
reveals the existence of strong country effects. Thus, the impact of contextual factors 
relating to the respondent’s country of origin often influences her attitudes towards 
democracy promotion. These country effects are also highly relevant when explaining the 
varying support of citizens for democracy promotion via military means. Accordingly, the 
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assumption about a common and civilian European identity regarding democracy 
promotion has to be taken with caution, even though a large majority of Europeans has not 
been in favour of democracy promotion via military means. 
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Questions from the Transatlantic Trends Survey 
Dependent Variables: Survey response to the following questions: 
a) “Do you think it should or should not be the role of the European Union to help establish 
democracy in other countries?” 
b) “Let’s imagine an authoritarian regime in which there is no political or religious freedom. To 
help democracy, would you support the following actions by the EU? 
1) Monitoring elections 
2) Supporting independent groups such as trade unions, human rights associations, and religious 
groups  
3) Imposing political sanctions 
4) Imposing economic sanctions 
5) Sending military forces to remove authoritarian regimes” 
Independent variables: Survey response to the following questions: 
a) “How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?” 
b) “I’d like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people [in this case, 
the European Union], with 100 meaning very warm, favorable feeling and 0 meaning a very cold 
unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly cold or warm.” 
c) “I’d like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people [in this case, 
Iran], with 100 meaning very warm, favorable feeling and 0 meaning a very cold unfavorable 
feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly cold or warm.” 
d) “In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale 
from 1 to 7, where 1 means the extreme left and 7 means the extreme right?” 
 
Appendix 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable 
name 
Variable definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Democracy 
promotion 
1=if respondent thinks that it is the 
role of the EU to help establish 
democracy in other countries; 0=other-
wise 
29970 0.7598599 0.4271755 0 1 
Send military 
troops for 
democracy 
promotion 
1=if respondent would support sen-
ding military forces to remove autho-
ritarian regimes; 0=otherwise 
14089 0.2973951 0.4571281 0 1 
Male 1=if male; 0=if female 29970 0.4857524 0.4998053 0 1 
Age Age of respondent 29970 46.44244 16.45637 18 99 
Household 
size 
No. of people living in the respon-
dent’s household, including him/her 
29970 2.29019 1.069528 1 14 
Elementary 
school  
1=if respondent completed elemen-
tary school or less; 0=otherwise  
29970 0.2053053 0.4039313 0 1 
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Metropolitan 1=if respondent resides in metropoli-
tan area; 0=otherwise 
29970 0.2240574 0.416967 0 1 
Highly skilled 
workers 
1=if respondent is currently employed/ 
self-employed and highly skilled; 
0=otherwise 
29970 0.4504838 0.4975504 0 1 
EU leader 1=if respondent finds it desirable that 
the European Union exerts strong 
leadership in world affairs; 0=other-
wise 
29970 0.795629 0.403248 0 1 
EU feeling Respondent’s rating towards the 
European Union. It ranges from 0 to 
100, with 100 meaning very warm, 
favourable feeling; 0 meaning a very 
cold, unfavourable feeling. 
29970 69.35279 23.20229 0 100 
Iran feeling Respondent’s rating towards Iran. It 
ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 
meaning very warm, favourable 
feeling; 0 meaning a very cold, un-
favourable feeling 
29970 28.99239 22.50379 0 100 
Political 
orientation 
Respondent’s political orientation 
where he/she places himself/herself 
on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means 
the extreme left and 7 means the 
extreme right 
29970 3.960093 1.340422 1 7 
Political 
orientation, 
squared 
Political orientation, squared 29970 17.47901 11.08519 1 49 
Death, long 
horizon ln 
Death of troops in Iraq and Afgha-
nistan, one year before survey starts. 
In logarithms. 
29970 1.274537 1.178565 0 4.47
7 
Death, short 
horizon ln 
Death of troops in Iraq and Afgha-
nistan, six months before survey 
starts. In logarithms. 
29970 0.6638711 0.9707091 0 3.61
1 
2005 1=if year is 2005; 0=otherwise 29970 0.2320654 0.4221575 0 1 
2006 1=if year is 2006; 0=otherwise 29970 0.2558892 0.4363671 0 1 
2007 1=if year is 2007; 0=otherwise 29970 0.2569903 0.4369813 0 1 
2008 1=if year is 2008; 0=otherwise 29970 0.2550551 0.4358994 0 1 
Germany 1=if country is Germany; 
0=otherwise 
29970 0.1185853 0.3233052 0 1 
France 1=if country is France; 0=otherwise 29970 0.1138805 0.3176714 0 1 
Spain 1=if country is Spain; 0=otherwise 29970 0.1148815 0.3188843 0 1 
Italy 1=if country is Italy; 0=otherwise 29970 0.0990324 0.2987105 0 1 
United 
Kingdom 
1=if country is United Kingdom; 
0=otherwise 
29970 0.0991658 0.2988895 0 1 
Netherlands 1=if country is Netherlands; 0=other-
wise 
29970 0.1184852 0.3231871 0 1 
Portugal 1=if country is Portugal; 0=otherwise 29970 0.0920921 0.2891607 0 1 
Poland 1=if country is Poland; 0=otherwise 29970 0.0746747 0.2628701 0 1 
Slovakia 1=if country is Slovakia; 0=otherwise 29970 0.0762429 0.2653908 0 1 
Bulgaria 1=if country is Bulgaria; 0=otherwise 29970 0.0509176 0.2198331 0 1 
Romania 1=if country is Romania; 0=otherwise 29970 0.042042 0.2006884 0 1 
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Appendix 2: Political orientation, by country 
Political 
Orientation 
Extreme 
Left Left 
Centre 
Left Centre 
Centre 
Right Right 
Extreme 
Right Total 
Germany 3.2 % 7.0 % 29.1 % 36.8 % 16.7 % 4.1 % 3.0 % 3,554 
France 3.6 % 8.0 % 27.8 % 30.4 % 21.7 % 5.8 % 2.7 % 3,413 
Spain 4.0 % 8.2 % 30.2 % 34.0 % 16.3 % 3.3 % 4.1 % 3,443 
Italy 3.7 % 10.7 % 28.5 % 20.8 % 22.6 % 9.3 % 4.2 % 2,968 
UK 3.3 % 3.9 % 21.6 % 40.1 % 20.7 % 5.2 % 5.2 % 2,972 
Netherlands 1.9 % 7.3 % 24.0 % 32.7 % 22.0 % 8.2 % 3.9 % 3,551 
Portugal 3.4 % 11.6 % 19.4 % 37.3 % 16.3 % 7.6 % 4.3 % 2,760 
Poland 3.3 % 11.6 % 11.2 % 24.2 % 16.9 % 26.3 % 6.4 % 2,238 
Slovakia 2.2 % 11.8 % 17.9 % 41.6 % 16.4 % 8.4 % 1.8 % 2,285 
Bulgaria 4.1 % 25.2 % 8.5 % 30.0 % 15.1 % 15.2 % 1.9 % 1,526 
Romania 1.7 % 18.4 % 13.5 % 19.3 % 22.7 % 20.6 % 3.8 % 1,260 
Total 3.2 % 9.9 % 22.9 % 32.4 % 19.0 % 8.9 % 3.8 % 29,970 
Appendix 3: Democracy promotion, individual countries 
Support for general democracy promotion, by country
average (2005–2008) 
Support for democracy promotion via military 
means (average 2005–2006) 
 No Yes Total  No Yes Total 
Germany 20.7 % 79.3 % 3,554 Germany 75.0 % 25.0 % 1,762 
France 23.7 % 76.3 % 3,413 France 65.0 % 35.0 % 1,747 
Spain 10.1 % 89.9 % 3,443 Spain 70.5 % 29.5 % 1,646 
Italy 23.8 % 76.2 % 2,968 Italy 77.6 % 22.4 % 1,423 
UK 40.7 % 59.3 % 2,972 UK 62.6 % 37.4 % 1,440 
Netherlands 25.1 % 74.9 % 3,551 Netherlands 64.7 % 35.3 % 1,763 
Portugal 13.4 % 86.6 % 2,760 Portugal 64.7 % 35.3 % 1,350 
Poland 24.8 % 75.2 % 2,238 Poland 69.9 % 30.1 % 1,102 
Slovakia 30.7 % 69.3 % 2,285 Slovakia 81.6 % 18.4 % 1,070 
Bulgaria 32.3 % 67.7 % 1,526 Bulgaria 84.3 % 15.7 % 452 
Romania 30.1 % 69.9 % 1,260 Romania 72.2 % 27.8 % 334 
Total 7,193 22,777 29,970 Total 9,899 4,190 14,089 
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Appendix 4:  Logit model: preferences for general democracy promotion 2005–2008 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Democracy 
Promotion 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Male  0.0182 (0.03)  0.0084 (0.03)  0.0308 (0.03)  0.0309 (0.03) 
Age  0.0036a (0.00)  0.0046a (0.00)  0.0049a (0.00)  0.0049a (0.00) 
Household size  0.0004 (0.01) -0.0181 (0.02) -0.0228 (0.02) -0.0224 (0.02) 
Elementary  
school or less 
-0.0898b (0.04) -0.0606 (0.04) -0.0478 (0.05) -0.0483 (0.05) 
Metropolitan -0.0184 (0.04) -0.0401 (0.04) -0.0319 (0.04) -0.0333 (0.04) 
Highly skilled  
workers 
 0.1147a (0.03)  0.0739b (0.03)  0.0791b (0.04)  0.0790b (0.04) 
EU Leadership    0.5143a (0.04)  0.4838a (0.04)  0.4842a (0.04) 
EU feeling    0.0105a (0.00)  0.0108a (0.00)  0.0108a (0.00) 
IRAN feeling   -0.0026a (0.00) -0.0030a (0.00) -0.0030a (0.00) 
Political 
orientation 
     0.2002a (0.06)  0.2008a (0.06) 
Political 
orientation sqrd 
    -0.0256a (0.01) -0.0256a (0.01) 
Deaths half year     -0.0648b (0.03)   
Deaths one year       -0.0427 (0.03) 
Year 2006 -0.1881a (0.04) -0.1940a (0.04) -0.1876a (0.05) -0.1931a (0.05) 
Year 2007 -0.1080b (0.04) -0.1535a (0.05) -0.1402a (0.05) -0.1381a (0.05) 
Year 2008 -0.1966a (0.04) -0.2130a (0.05) -0.2530a (0.05) -0.2269a (0.05) 
Germany  0.5790a (0.06)  0.5531a (0.07)  0.4744a (0.08)  0.4985a (0.08) 
France  0.3438a (0.06)  0.4527a (0.07)  0.4029a (0.08)  0.4221a (0.08) 
Spain  1.3983a (0.07)  1.4399a (0.08)  1.3614a (0.09)  1.3555a (0.09) 
Italy  0.4194a (0.06)  0.3762a (0.07)  0.3623a (0.08)  0.3694a (0.08) 
United Kingdom -0.4713a (0.06) -0.2302a (0.07) -0.1313 (0.11) -0.1630 (0.11) 
Netherlands  0.2848a (0.06)  0.3617a (0.07)  0.3105a (0.08)  0.3129a (0.08) 
Portugal  1.1092a (0.07)  1.1268a (0.08)  1.0171a (0.09)  1.0272a (0.09) 
Poland  0.2395a (0.06)  0.3052a (0.07)  0.3560a (0.08)  0.3620a (0.08) 
Slovakia  0.0243 (0.06)  0.1175c (0.07)  0.0288 (0.08)  0.0444 (0.08) 
Bulgaria  0.0256 (0.06)  0.0383 (0.07) -0.1055 (0.09) -0.0915 (0.09) 
Constant  0.6907a (0.09) -0.3421a (0.11) -0.5949a (0.16) -0.5962a (0.16) 
Observations 38013  34326  29970  29970  
Log -20899.43  -18614.95  -16549.67  -16551.90  
Wald 1425.17  1688.43  1513.67  1506.34  
P-value  0.00   0.00   0.00  0.00  
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Years 2005–2008. a significant at the 1 per cent 
level; b significant at the 5 per cent level; c significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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Appendix 5: Logit model: democracy promotion via military intervention 2005–2006 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Send military force Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Coeff. St. 
Error 
Male  0.0447 (0.04)  0.0617 (0.04)  0.0759c (0.04)  0.0766c (0.04) 
Age -0.0172a (0.00) -0.0180a (0.00) -0.0194a (0.00) -0.0194a (0.00) 
Household size -0.0013 (0.02) -0.0078 (0.02) -0.0027 (0.02) -0.0025 (0.02) 
Elementary school 
or less 
 0.3789a (0.05)  0.3852a (0.06)  0.3885a (0.06)  0.3897a (0.06) 
Metropolitan -0.1502a (0.05) -0.1546a (0.05) -0.1643a (0.05) -0.1672a (0.05) 
Highly skilled 
workers 
-0.1755a (0.04) -0.1982a (0.04) -0.1969a (0.05) -0.1966a (0.05) 
EU leadership    0.0897 (0.05)  0.0986c (0.06)  0.1016c (0.06) 
EU feeling    0.0025b (0.00)  0.0026b (0.00)  0.0026b (0.00) 
Iran feeling   -0.0080a (0.00) -0.0079a (0.00) -0.0079a (0.00) 
Political orientation     -0.2329a (0.08) -0.2342a (0.08) 
Political orientation 
sqrd 
     0.0503a (0.01)  0.0505a (0.01) 
Deaths half year     -0.0884 (0.10)   
Deaths one year       -0.0240 (0.04) 
Year 2006 -0.4036a (0.04) -0.4308a (0.04) -0.4123a (0.05) -0.4267a (0.04) 
Germany -0.3454a (0.11) -0.4223a (0.13) -0.4330b (0.18) -0.3493b (0.15) 
France  0.1647 (0.10)  0.1170 (0.12)  0.1988 (0.15)  0.2016 (0.15) 
Spain -0.1383 (0.10) -0.1887 (0.12) -0.2137 (0.18) -0.1494 (0.15) 
Italy -0.7216a (0.11) -0.7886a (0.13) -0.6335a (0.17) -0.6779a (0.16) 
United Kingdom  0.4141a (0.10)  0.4368a (0.13)  0.6048a (0.23)  0.5056a (0.18) 
Netherlands  0.3267a (0.10)  0.2691b (0.13)  0.2152 (0.18)  0.2876c (0.15) 
Portugal  0.1075 (0.10)  0.0044 (0.13) -0.0453 (0.18)  0.0266 (0.15) 
Poland -0.1453 (0.11) -0.1488 (0.13) -0.2845c (0.16) -0.2198 (0.15) 
Slovakia -0.7715a (0.11) -0.8870a (0.14) -0.9811a (0.19) -0.9003a (0.16) 
Bulgaria -0.8350a (0.14) -0.8303a (0.16) -0.8344a (0.22) -0.7302a (0.19) 
Constant  0.2164c (0.13)  0.3211c (0.17)  0.4352 (0.27)  0.3784 (0.25) 
Observations 17575  15956  14089  14089  
Log -10339.8  -9434.5  -8463.6  -8463.8  
Wald 657.88  639.87  672.74  672.45  
P-value  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00  
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Years 2005–2006. a significant at the 1 per cent 
level; b significant at the 5 per cent level; c significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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